Housing Bubble: Lost In Translation

Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Bies has clearly learned the ways of Greenspan-speak, judging by this incredibly veiled warning about the perils of "creative" mortgage lending. Here is the full text of her remarks for the interested.

Highlights for me:

In 2005, option ARMs and IOs were an estimated one-third of total U.S. mortgage originations. By contrast, in 2003, these products were estimated to represent less than 10 percent of total originations. Despite the recent publicity, however, it is estimated that these mortgages still account for less than 20 percent of aggregate domestic mortgage outstandings of $8 trillion. While the credit quality of residential mortgages generally remains strong, the Federal Reserve and other banking supervisors are concerned that current risk-management techniques may not fully address the level of risk in nontraditional mortgages, a risk that would be heightened by a downturn in the housing market.

Nontraditional mortgage products have been available for many years; however, these types of mortgages were historically offered to higher-income borrowers only. More recently, these products have been offered to a wider spectrum of consumers, including subprime borrowers who may be less suited for these types of mortgages and may not fully recognize their embedded risks. These borrowers are more likely to experience an unmanageable payment shock at some point during the life of the loan, which means they may be more likely to default on the loan. Further, nontraditional mortgage loans are becoming more prevalent in the subprime market at the same time that risk tolerances in the capital markets have increased. When risk spreads return to more “normal” levels, banks need to be prepared for the resulting impact on liquidity and pricing. Supervisors have also observed that lenders are increasingly combining nontraditional mortgage loans with weaker mitigating controls on credit exposures, such as allowing reduced documentation in evaluating the applicant’s creditworthiness and making simultaneous second-lien mortgages as competition in the mortgage banking industry intensifies. These “risk layering” practices have become more and more prevalent in mortgage originations. Thus, while elements of the product structure may have been used successfully by some banks in the past, the absence of traditional underwriting controls may have unforeseen effects on losses realized in these products.

Shorter Susan Bies: "We let the market get flooded with no-document loans and easy credit for anyone with a heartbeat, and paid absolutely no attention to oversight or enforcement because housing prices were what's keeping the economy going. Now the market is sliding, we're facing foreclosures up the kazoo, and have no idea what to do about it."

Or, put another way:

Posted at February 2, 2006 05:39 PM

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Federal Reserve Board Governor Susan Bies has clearly learned the ways of Greenspan-speak, judging by this incredibly veiled warning about the perils of "creative" mortgage lending. Here is the full text of her remarks for the interested. Highlights for me: In 2005, option ARMs and IOs were an estimated one-third of total U.S. mortgage originations. By contrast, in 2003, these products were estimated to represent less than 10 percent of total originations. Despite the recent publicity, however, it is estimated that these mortgages still account for less than 20 percent of aggregate domestic mortgage outstandings of $8 trillion. While the credit quality of residential mortgages generally remains strong, the Federal Reserve and other banking supervisors are concerned that current risk-management techniques may not fully address the level of risk in nontraditional mortgages, a risk that would be heightened by a downturn in the housing market. Nontraditional mortgage products have been available for many years; however, these types of mortgages were historically offered to higher-income borrowers only. More recently, these products have been offered to a wider spectrum of consumers, including subprime borrowers who may be less suited for these types of mortgages and may not fully recognize their embedded risks. These borrowers are more likely to experience an unmanageable payment shock at some point during the life of the loan, which means they may be more likely to default on the loan. Further, nontraditional mortgage loans are becoming more prevalent in the subprime market at the same time that risk tolerances in the capital markets have increased. When risk spreads return to more “normal” levels, banks need to be prepared for the resulting impact on liquidity and pricing. Supervisors have also observed that lenders are increasingly combining nontraditional mortgage loans with weaker mitigating controls on credit exposures, such as allowing reduced documentation in evaluating the applicant’s creditworthiness and making simultaneous second-lien mortgages as competition in the mortgage banking industry intensifies. These “risk layering” practices have become more and more prevalent in mortgage originations. Thus, while elements of the product structure may have been used successfully by some banks in the past, the absence of traditional underwriting controls may have unforeseen effects on losses realized in these products. Shorter Susan Bies: "We let the market get flooded with no-document loans and easy credit for anyone with a heartbeat, and paid absolutely no attention to oversight or enforcement because housing prices were what's keeping the economy going. Now the market is sliding, we're facing foreclosures up the kazoo, and have no idea what to do about it." Or, put another way: